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sense that the present values of the ﬁrms computed with the personal prices of the stockholders and with
the Dr` eze’s prices coincide when short sales are allowed. We also show that these conditions are simpler if
we consider an allocation at which each consumer maximizes his preferences, when they are smooth. This
allows us to give a formal deﬁnition for the objective of the ﬁrms, which extend the Dr` eze’s criterion. We
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1 Introduction
We consider an economy with time, uncertainty, several periods, several commodities at each state of
nature and production. The transfer of wealth among periods and states of nature is possible through
ﬁnancial markets on the stocks of the ﬁrms. In this setting, it is known that the stockholders may
disagree on the choice of the optimal production plans. Indeed, the share in the proﬁt of a ﬁrm may
have two diﬀerent roles: an increase of the wealth in the future and a decrease on the risk among
the states of nature. Since the shareholders may have diﬀerent state prices, they may have a diﬀerent
evaluation of the production plans, and, thus they may have diﬀerent optimal production plans.
A similar phenomenon appears when the ﬁrms have a strategic behavior on the market that is
under imperfect competition. Indeed a conﬂict may appear for the agents between their interest as
consumers of the products of the ﬁrms and as shareholders. Recent papers address the question of
the objective of the ﬁrms in this setting (See Bejan (2003), Dierker, Dierker and Grodal (2001)). An
important diﬀerence comes from the fact that the shareholders have ﬁxed shares since there is no stock
market in these papers whereas it is a mean to transfer wealth among states of nature in our model.
When market are complete or when the spanning condition holds true, then, even if the state
prices are diﬀerent at equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition on the prices of the stocks implies that
the optimal production plan is independent of the state prices. This is the case under the assumptions
of Diamond’s article (1967). Nevertheless, the spanning condition is restrictive since it means that the
production sets are included in the linear space spanned by the equilibrium production plans. In other
words, no ﬁrm has the possibility to implement a production plan, which is a true innovation in the
sense that it is not a linear combination of existing production plans.
Our aim is to provide an objective for the ﬁrms in the general case without spanning condition. We
follow the methodology initiated by Dr` eze (1974) and the program in the concluding remarks, which
propose to extend the results to a multi-period, multi-commodity economy. Since we consider large
ﬁrms, which have access to the stock markets, we do not impose any convexity assumption on the
production sector. Indeed, the need for a large capital and the access to the stock market is justiﬁed
by large ﬁxed costs or increasing returns in the production.
The methodology is the following. Since it is hopeless to get a ﬁrst best Pareto optimal equilibrium
allocation, we consider a constrained Pareto optimal allocation. This means that the planner can
redistribute the income among the consumers only through the ﬁnancial market structure. Then,
we exhibit the ﬁrst order necessary conditions, and, we deduce from them a criterion for the ﬁrm’s
behavior. Note that this methodology is similar to the one of Guesnerie (1975) to deﬁne formally the
marginal cost-pricing rule in a general equilibrium framework for non-convex ﬁrms.
In Bonnisseau–Lachiri (2002), we have considered an economy with several periods but only one
perishable commodity at each state of nature. We show that the Dr` eze’s criterion has a natural
extension. This means that the ﬁrms are asked to satisfy a ﬁrst order necessary condition of proﬁt
maximization with respect to the Dr` eze’s prices. At each node, these prices are computed as a convex
combination of the states prices of the stockholders, the coeﬃcients being the shares held in the ﬁrm
at this node. We cannot hope to have more than a necessary condition since the production sets are
not supposed to be convex.
Furthermore, the non-convexity of the constrained attainable set excludes that the necessary condi-
tions be enough to obtained a constrained Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation even if the productions
sets are convex.
We refer to our previous paper for a discussion on the link with the criterion given in Grossman–
Hart (1979), which diﬀers from the Dr` eze’s one by the fact that the prices are computed with the ﬁxed
initial shares. In brief, this criterion satisﬁes a short-term weak optimality condition but it does not
take into account the inter-temporal eﬀect of the decisions.
In our general framework, the problem is not well posed. The notion of constrained feasible al-
locations is not well deﬁned contrary to the case of a two period-one commodity economy. Indeed,
commodity and stock prices enter into the deﬁnition and there are several possibilities to write formally3
that the transfers take place through the ﬁnancial structure. Actually, the diﬀerences come from the
possibility or not for the planner to change the spot or the stock prices.
Thus, we consider the largest possible constrained attainable set, which corresponds to the smallest
constrained Pareto optimal set. This means that the planner has the possibility to choose the prices
for the future periods. Nevertheless, we also investigate several variants of the deﬁnition of constrained
feasibility. In each case, we give the necessary conditions at a constrained Pareto optimal allocation.
The proofs are similar but simpler with smaller constrained attainable sets since we have less variables.
Note that the deﬁnition of constrained attainability is independent of the preferences of the agents
like in Dr` eze (1974) or Magill–Quinzii (1996) but it is not directly comparable with the one in Geanako-
plos et al. (1990), since in this last paper, the consumers are supposed to maximize the preferences
under the prices set by the planner.
Contrary to our intuition, we cannot simply extend our previous results since the ﬁnancial feasibility
constraints with several commodities induce a deep change in the necessary conditions. Indeed, they
give the existence of a supporting price for each consumer at the optimal allocation, but, if we consider
the restrictions of these supporting prices at a given node, they are not always colinear. They only
remain in a two dimensional space. This phenomenon disappears with only one commodity since the
space of spot prices is of dimension 1. This fact remains true whatever is the deﬁnition of constrained
Pareto optimality.
Consequently, the Dr` eze’s prices do not depend only on the spot prices and the state prices of the
stockholders. Nevertheless, we show that the present values of the ﬁrms with respect to these prices
are consistent with the present values computed with the supporting prices of the consumers even if
the state prices are not the same and the spot prices are not colinear. In particular, all present values
coincide when short sales are allowed. This means that the evaluations of the stockholders coincide
with the evaluation of the manager with the Dr` eze’s prices.
To overcome the diﬃculty of deﬁning an objective for the ﬁrms, we consider a pre-equilibrium, that
is, a physical and ﬁnancial feasible state such that the consumption plans are optimal in the budget
sets. Then, if the preferences are smooth and if this allocation is constrained Pareto optimal in the
weakest possible sense, we recover the expected formula for the ﬁrm’s prices. Thus, in this case, we
can deﬁne an objective for the ﬁrms, which is consistent with the optimality conditions, and, which is
the natural extension of the Dr` eze’s criterion.
For the proof, we use a non-convex separation theorem, which comes from an unpublished work of
Cornet and Rockafellar, (see the proof in Aliprantis et al. (2002)). This result has been extended by
Jofr´ e and Rivera (1999) and we actually use a slight generalization of it to take into account the fact
that our variables do not lie in the same linear space. It allows us to work with all variables avoiding
partial approaches as in previous works.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we describe the general framework and the ﬁnancial
markets. Section 3 is devoted to the statements of the results with the necessary conditions for
the constrained optimal allocations, the variants with diﬀerent deﬁnitions, the consequences on the
valuation of the production plans, and, ﬁnally, the extension of the Dr` eze’s criterion. The last section
gathers the mathematical arguments.
2 Description of the economy
We consider an inter-temporal economy with uncertainty. The model and the notations are essentially
borrowed from Magill-Quinzii (1996). There are T periods (T ≥ 2), and, T = {0,1,...,T}. As usual,
the uncertainty is described by a tree of events (or nodes) D. ξ0 is the unique node at date 0. Dt
denotes the nodes at date t. For each non-initial node ξ ∈ D+ = D \ {ξ0}, there exists a unique
predecessor denoted ξ−. For each non-terminal node ξ ∈ D− = D \ DT, we denote by ξ+ the set of
immediate successors of ξ. Finally, we denote D
−
0 = D− \ {ξ0}. We assume that there is L perishable
commodities at each node. Thus, the space of goods is RLD. We denote by 1 the vector of RL, whose
coordinates are all equal to 1, and, for all ξ ∈ D, by 1ξ, the vector of RLD deﬁned by 1ξ(ξ) = 14
and 1ξ(ξ0) = 0 for all ξ0 6= ξ. Proj
⊥
1⊥ denotes the orthogonal projection in RL on 1⊥ the orthogonal
complement of 1.
A consumer/investor is represented by the superscript i in the set I = {1,...,I}, (I ≥ 1). A ﬁrm
is represented by the superscript j in the set J = {1,...,J}, (J ≥ 1).
At each node, a market is open for the perishable commodities. For every non-terminal node, a
stock market is open, on which the stocks of the ﬁrms are exchanged. The commodity prices are
denoted by p = (p(ξ))ξ∈D ∈ RLD. The share prices for the ﬁrm j are denoted qj = (qj(ξ))ξ∈D− ∈ RD
−
.
To simplify the notations, we also denote by qj the vector in RD where qj(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ DT. A




)J. To simplify the notations, we also denote by ai the vector in (RD)J where
ai
j(ξ) = ai
j(ξ−) for all ξ ∈ DT. The preferences of the ith agent is represented by the correspondence
Pi from the nonnegative orthant RLD
+ to itself. For all xi ∈ RLD
+ , Pi(xi) is the set of consumption plan
strictly preferred by the agent to xi. we posit the following weak monotony assumption at each state
on the preferences. It means that the vector 1 is desirable in each state of nature.
Assumption C. For all i ∈ I, for all xi ∈ RD
+ and for all ξ ∈ D, there exists ε > 0 such that for all
t ∈]0,ε[, for all xi0 ∈ B(xi,ε) ∩ adhPi(xi), xi0 + t1ξ ∈ Pi(xi).
We assume that every agent i has an initial endowment of commodities denoted by ei ∈ RLD
+ . At
date 0, the consumers have an initial share denoted for convenience ai(ξ
−






0 ) = 1 for all j ∈ J.
On the production side, every ﬁrm is described by a production set Y j, a subset of RLD. A
production plan is denoted yj = (yj(ξ))ξ∈D and y = (yj)j∈J ∈
Q
j∈J Y j denotes a collections of
production plans of the whole production sector. Let y be a global production plan of the production
sector, and, (p,q) be commodity and stock prices. We now describe the budget constraints of agent i.
At each node ξ, he receives the share of the proﬁts (or losses) of the ﬁrms according to his portfolio at
the previous node, he can trade on the commodity market at the price p(ξ), and, at the non-terminal























where •` denotes the standard inner product in RL, and, •j denotes the standard inner product in RJ,
or, the sum over j, that is, ai(ξ)•j y(ξ) =
P
j∈J ai












p(ξ)•`(xi(ξ) − ei(ξ)) ≤ q(ξ)•j(ai(ξ−) − ai(ξ))
+p(ξ)•`(ai(ξ−)•j y(ξ)),∀ξ ∈ D
)
.
If short sales are allowed, the only diﬀerence is that ai is chosen in (RD
−
)J instead of (RD
−
+ )J.
3 Statement of the Results
Our aim is to provide a rule for the producers’ behavior. We ﬁrst recall the usual conditions for the
consumers and for the markets at a stock market equilibrium. We call such collection a pre-equilibrium
since we do not impose any restriction on the production plans.






j∈J Yj is a pre-equilibrium if
a) for each i,
 
xi,ai






∩ Bi(p,q,y) = ∅;5
b)
P
i∈I(xi − ei) =
P
j∈J yj;




Remarks 1 The ﬁrst condition means that the consumers choose an optimal consumption-portfolio
pair taken the prices and the production plans as given. Condition b) requires that supply equals
demand for every commodities at every node ξ, and, Condition c) requires the same for the stock
markets.
The following result gives two consequences of Assumption C on the pre-equilibrium allocation.
Its proof is a routine.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption C, if (p,q,x,a,y) is a pre-equilibrium, then for all states ξ ∈ D,























and the spot prices satisfy p(ξ)•` 1 > 0 for all ξ.
Thus, from now on, we consider normalized spot prices in the aﬃne hyperplan H = {p ∈ RL |
p•` 1 = 1}.
3.1 Constrained Pareto-Optima
This subsection is devoted to the problem of deﬁning constrained attainable allocation with several
goods and periods, and, to investigate the consequences on the necessary conditions of optimality and
on the desirable behavior for the ﬁrms. The basic idea is: a constrained attainable allocation must be
physically feasible in each node, the transfers among the consumers are free at the initial node, and,
then, they must be ﬁnanced through the stock market.
With one perishable commodity and two periods, there is only one-way to deﬁne what constrained
feasibility means since it does not depend on the prices. With more than one commodity or more than
two periods, the situation is quite diﬀerent since, contrary to the usual Arrow–Debreu framework, the
commodity prices and the asset prices matter. Hence, the deﬁnition may assume either that the prices
are given and the transfers must be done through these prices, or, there exists some prices, which
ﬁnance the transfers.
We consider the largest possible set of constrained allocation in this sub-section and in the following.
Later, we discuss the modiﬁcations in the optimality conditions with weaker notions of constrained
Pareto optimality. Note that we do not assume that the consumers are at an optimal consumption
plan, according to Magill–Quinzii (Deﬁnition 31.7) (1996) but contrary to Geanakoplos et al (1990).
Indeed, to be in the spirit of an Arrow-Debreu economy, we choose a concept of attainability, which is
independent of consumers’ preferences.
Deﬁnition 2 A collection of allocations (x,a,y) ∈ (RLD




j∈J Yj is constrained
feasible if :
a) there exist a stock price q ∈ (RD
+
)J, with q(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ DT, and a commodity price p ∈ HD
+





















with ai(ξ) = ai(ξ−) for all ξ ∈ DT;
b)
P
i∈I(xi − ei) =
P
j∈J yj;6




The deﬁnition of constrained feasibility gives directly the one of constrained Pareto optimality.
Deﬁnition 3 A constrained feasible allocation (x,a,y) is constrained Pareto optimal if there exists no
Pareto superior constrained feasible allocation (x0,a0,y0) (i.e x0i ∈ Pi(xi) for all i ∈ I).
3.2 First-Order Optimality Conditions of Constrained Eﬃciency
The following result states the ﬁrst order necessary condition for constrained Pareto optimal allocation.
In the following, N(C,c) denotes the Clarke’s normal cone to C at c, which coincides with the standard
normal cone of convex analysis when C is convex (See, Clarke (1983) for a precise deﬁnition and the
main properties).
Theorem 3.1 Let (x,a,y) be a constrained Pareto optimal allocation. Since it is constrained feasible,
there exist a stock price vector q ∈ RD
+
and a commodity price vector p ∈ HD
+
, which ﬁnance the
allocation (x,a,y). We assume that Assumption C holds true for each consumer, and, for all j ∈ J, Y j
is closed. Then, there exist v ∈ (RJ)D
−
, p(ξ0) ∈ RL, with p(ξ0)•` 1 ≥ 0, σ ∈ (1⊥)D
+
and π ∈ (RD
+
+ )I,






























and for some i,pi 6= 0;
(ii) For all j ∈ J,
pj ∈ N(Y j,yj); (2)














 = 0; (3)







ai (ξ) − ai  
ξ−
= 0; (4)
(v) For all i ∈ I, ∀ξ ∈ D−,






























 = 0, (6)
with q(ξ0) = 0.7
Condition (i) means that the price pi is a supporting price for the consumption xi. In preferences
are convex, this means that the consumer minimizes the expenditure at xi for the price pi. The
presence of the term σ(ξ) in the deﬁnition of the supporting price pi comes from the fact that, at
each state of nature, the price, which ﬁnances the allocation, has no reason to be the price, which
supports the allocation. With only one perishable commodity per state of nature, σ(ξ) = 0 since the
space of commodity at each state is one dimensional, and, thus the orthogonal to 1 is reduced to 0.
The presence of σ in the formula deﬁning pi implies that the supporting prices at each node are not
necessarily colinear like in a standard Arrow–Debreu economy but stay in a two dimensional spaces.
If the state prices πi are the same for the consumers, which is the case if the markets are complete for
(p,q,y), then we recover the equality of the supporting prices and they also coincide with the prices
given in Condition (ii) for the producers.
Condition (ii) is the basis for the deﬁnition of the Dr` eze’s criterion. We come back at the end of
the section on this point. Condition (ii) means that the producers satisfy the ﬁrst order necessary
condition for proﬁt maximization with respect to the price pj. The price pj is computed from the
supporting prices of the stockholders. At each node, pj(ξ) is a convex combination of the personal
spot prices pi(ξ) of the stockholders and the coeﬃcient are the shares at the previous node. This comes
from the fact that the dividends are distributed according to the shares at the previous node. If we
modify this convention, the formula will be changed according to the chosen dividend process.
Condition (iii) comes from the optimality condition with respect to spot prices p(ξ). Indeed, in
the deﬁnition of constrained feasibility, the planner has the possibility to choose the spot prices, which
determine the possible transfers in the future. We show later that this condition disappear when
we change the deﬁnition of constrained feasibility considering the spot prices as given. The same
remark holds for Condition (iv) and the stock prices qj. With only one perishable commodity at
each node, Condition (iii) is a consequence of the budget constraints and of Condition (iv) since then
xi(ξ) − ei(ξ) −
P
j∈J ai
j(ξ−)yj(ξ) = q(ξ)•j(ai(ξ−) − (ai(ξ)). If all state prices are equal, then it is a
consequence of the physical market clearing condition.
Under the same assumption, Condition (iv) is a consequence of the market clearing condition on
the stock market. In the general case, Conditions (iii) and (iv) means that the weighted sums of the
net trades either on the commodity market or on the stock market vanish in each state, taking the
state prices as coeﬃcients.
Condition (v) corresponds to the absence of arbitrage opportunity for the consumer. Nevertheless,
since the planner has the possibility to ﬁx the stock prices, then, the conclusion is weaker than the
usual one. Indeed, one gets an additional parameter v(ξ), which is the same for all consumers. If
the consumers are not constrained on the stock market, the usual condition of absence of arbitrage
opportunity implies that v(ξ) is equal to 0.
In Bonnisseau–Lachiri (2002), we give an example of a constrained Pareto optimal allocation at
which v is not equal to 0. This means that at such allocation, every consumers would like to sell (or
to buy) the stocks for which vj(ξ) is diﬀerent from 0, but it is impossible at a global level since the
market clearing condition would be violated. So, from an individual point of view, the allocation is
not optimal, but from a global point of view, it is optimal.
If we allow for short sales, then Condition (v) becomes stronger since equality holds true for every
consumer and not only for the consumers having a positive share in the ﬁrm j. It suﬃces to remark
that the normal cone computed in formula (17) of the proof is reduced to 0 since (RD
−




We now come back to the deﬁnition of constrained feasible allocation. Indeed, we may assume
that either the stock price vector or the commodity price vector is ﬁxed, or even that the two are
given. This has a sense if we consider a pre-equilibrium where the price vectors are given and if we
want to check if this allocation is optimal in some more or less strong sense. This means that the
set of constrained feasible allocations is more or less large, and, consequently, being optimal is less
demanding. Part of the conditions given in Theorem 3.1 remains true. The proof is easily deduced8
from the one given in the next section, since it means that some variables are kept ﬁxed. Hence the
computations are the same and even simpler, since they are less variables. More precisely, let us deﬁne
three notions of weakly constrained Pareto optimal allocation as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 Let (x,a,y) ∈ (RLD




j∈J Yj be a collection physically feasible, which
means that it satisﬁes Conditions b) and c) of Deﬁnition 2.
(i) Let p ∈ HD
+
. A collection (x,a,y) is p-constrained feasible if there exists a stock price q ∈ (RD
+
)J,
with q(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ DT, such that for all i ∈ I, for all ξ ∈ D+,
p(ξ)•
`
(xi(ξ) − ei(ξ)) = q(ξ)•
j





with ai(ξ) = ai(ξ−) for all ξ ∈ DT;
(ii) Let q ∈ (RD
+
)J, with q(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ DT. A collection (x,a,y) is q-constrained feasible if
there exists p ∈ HD
+
such that for all i ∈ I, for all ξ ∈ D+,
p(ξ)•
`
(xi(ξ) − ei(ξ)) = q(ξ)•
j





with ai(ξ) = ai(ξ−) for all ξ ∈ DT;
(iii) Let p ∈ HD
+
and q ∈ (RD
+
)J, with q(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ DT. A collection (x,a,y) is (p,q)-
constrained feasible if for all i ∈ I, for all ξ ∈ D+,
p(ξ)•
`
(xi(ξ) − ei(ξ)) = q(ξ)•
j





with ai(ξ) = ai(ξ−) for all ξ ∈ DT;
A p–constrained (resp. q–constrained, resp. (p,q)–constrained) feasible allocation (x,a,y) is weakly
p–constrained (resp. q–constrained, resp. (p,q)–constrained) Pareto optimal if there exists no Pareto
superior p–constrained (resp. q–constrained, resp. (p,q)–constrained) feasible allocation.
Corollary 3.1 Let (x,a,y) be a weakly p–constrained (resp. q–constrained, resp. (p,q)–constrained)
Pareto optimal allocation. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 and with their notations, Conditions
(i), (ii), (iv) and (v) (resp. (i), (ii), (iii) and (v), resp. (i), (ii) and (v)) hold true.
Note that the Conditions given by the corollary are less restrictive than the one given by Theorem
3.1, which is a consequence of the fact that the set of feasible allocations is smaller. Nevertheless, the
two ﬁrst conditions always hold true, which means that the supporting prices for the consumptions
and for the productions remain the same whatever is the deﬁnition of constrained feasibility.
3.3 On the value of the ﬁrms
In the following proposition, we compare the present values of the production plan evaluated at the
price pj and at the personal price pi for each consumer. If Conditions (iv) and (v) of Theorem 3.1
hold, then equality holds if the consumer is a stockholder at each state or if short sales are allowed.
So even if the stockholders do not have the same personal prices, even if these prices in a state are
not colinear, it remains that the present value of a production plan is the same for all consumers and
equal to the present value computed with the supporting price of the ﬁrm. Thus, the present value
of a production plan is well deﬁned if the necessary conditions for constrained Pareto optimality are
satisﬁed. Consequently, if the manager of the ﬁrm is asked to choose a production plan according
to Condition (ii), then her/his evaluation of the present value of the ﬁrm is equal to the one of the
stockholders. If short sales are not allowed, one only gets an inequality, that is the evaluation by9
the price pj is greater or equal to the evaluation by the price pi. Note that the shareholders does not
receive a part of the proﬁt at the states where her/his share is 0. Thus, she/he is interested to compute
the present value taking into account only the states at which she/he has a positive share. Then, the
partial evaluations coincide if we restrict the computation to those states.
Proposition 2 Let (x,a,y) be a constrained feasible allocation. Let q ∈ RD
−
0 a stock price and p ∈
HD
+
, which ﬁnance it. If the necessary conditions (iv) and (v) of Theorem 3.1 are satisﬁed, then, with
the notations of Theorem 3.1, one has for all j ∈ J, for all i ∈ I,










yj(ξ) ≥ pi · yj.
There is an equality if ai



































The equality comes from the fact that
P
i∈I ai
j(ξ−) = 1 for all ξ. For each t between 0 and T − 1,

























with qj(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ DT. Since
P
i∈I ai












































































Consequently, this leads to the announced formula. In the same way, one computes pi·yj, but one has
to replace some equalities by inequalities at the states ξ such that ai
j(ξ) = 0, which gives the inequality
pj ·yj ≥ pi ·yj. When short sales are possible or when a consumer is a stockholder of the ﬁrm at each
node, there are only equalities, hence, one gets also an equality after the computation.
3.4 On the objective of the ﬁrm
We present in this subsection the link with the Dr` eze’s criterion (1974) extended in Bonnisseau–Lachiri
(2002) to a multi-period economy with only one commodity per state. Indeed, the Dr` eze’s criterion
can be deﬁned as follows: the ﬁrms must maximize the proﬁt (or at least satisfy a necessary condition
for proﬁt maximization) with respect to the Dr` eze’s prices (pj) deﬁned by: for every j ∈ J,
pj(ξ) =
(
p(ξ0) if ξ = ξ0  P
i∈I πi(ξ) · ai
j(ξ−)

· p(ξ) if ξ ∈ D+,
for all ξ ∈ D+.
This price is obtained by considering state prices, which are a convex combination of the state
prices of the stockholders, where the weights are the shares at the previous node. Nevertheless, the
Condition (ii) of Theorem 3.1 does not ﬁt with this deﬁnition since one has this additional parameter
σ(ξ). The following proposition shows that we recover the Dr` eze’s price at a constrained Pareto optimal
allocation, when it is also a pre-equilibrium and the preferences are smooth.
Proposition 3 Let (p,q,x,a,y) be a weakly (p,q)–constrained Pareto optimal pre-equilibrium with
p ∈ HD. Under the Assumption of Theorem 3.1, if for each consumer, N(adhPi(xi),xi) is an half
line, then there exists p(ξ0) ∈ RL and π ∈ (RD
+
+ )I, such that Conditions (i), (ii) and (v) of Theorem
3.1 hold true with σ = 0, v = 0 and, either p(ξ0) = p(ξ0), or p(ξ0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. We start by recalling the necessary conditions for the consumer’s maximization
problem.





j∈J Y j. If (xi,ai) ∈ RLD
+ × (RD
−
+ )J is a maximal element of Pi in the budget set Bi(p,q,y),






















,∀ξ ∈ D; (7)
and there exists πi ∈ RD



























Conversely, if (xi,ai) ∈ (RL
+)D × (RD
−
+ )J satisﬁes the above conditions with respect to πi ∈ RD
+, if P
ξ∈D πi(ξ)p(ξ)•` xi(ξ) > 0, and if Pi(xi) is open and convex, then (xi,ai) is a maximal element of
Pi in the budget set and πi ∈ RD
++.
The proof of this lemma is given in the next section.
We now apply Corollary 3.1 to (x,a,y), which is ﬁnanced by the prices p and q. There exist
v ∈ (RJ)D
−
, p(ξ0) ∈ RL, σ ∈ (1⊥)D
+
and π ∈ (RI
+)D
+
, which satisfy Conditions (i), (ii) and (v)
of Theorem 3.1. From Lemma 1, for all i, there exists πi0 ∈ RD
+ \ {0} such that −(πi0(ξ)p(ξ))ξ∈D ∈
N(adhPi(xi),xi). Since the preferences are smooth, the vectors pi = (p(ξ0),(πi(ξ)p(ξ) + σ(ξ))) and
(πi0(ξ)p(ξ)) are positively colinear. Since at least one price pi is not equal to 0 and πi0 is diﬀerent
from 0, one gets that there exists ti > 0 such that tiπi0(ξ0)p(ξ0) = p(ξ0)) and, for all ξ ∈ D+,
tiπi0(ξ)p(ξ) = πi(ξ)p(ξ) + σ(ξ). Since p(ξ) ∈ H, one deduces that σ(ξ) = 0. If πi0(ξ0) > 0, p(ξ0) is
positively proportional to p(ξ0), and, since the p(ξ0) and π are deﬁned up to the multiplication by a
positive scalar, we can choose p(ξ0) = p(ξ0). Finally, for each i ∈ I, either πi is positively proportional
to πi0 or is equal to 0. Then Condition (9) of Lemma 1 implies that v = 0 in Condition (v) of Theorem
3.1 since at each node, there exists at least one consumer such that ai
j(ξ) > 0.
We can conclude with the following deﬁnition of a stock market equilibrium in which the list of
conditions incorporate the one for a pre-equilibrium and an additional one for the producers: the
Dr` eze’s criterion. The ﬁrms are asked to choose a production plan, which satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
necessary condition for proﬁt maximization with respect to the Dr` eze’s price given by Condition (ii) of
Theorem 3.1. The formulation is intricate since the state prices of the consumers enter in the deﬁnition
of the Dr` eze’s price.







j∈J Yj is a stock market equilibrium if it is a pre-equilibrium, and, if there exist π(ξ0) ≥ 0, π ∈ (RD
+
+ )I
such that for all i ∈ I, 0 6= (π(ξ0),(πi(ξ))) and Conditions (8) and (9) of Lemma 1 hold true, and, for


















4 Proofs of the results
4.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
First step: necessary conditions. If (xi,ai) is a maximal element, one has
(xi,ai) ∈ Bi (p,q,y) and ˜ Pi  
xi




















p(ξ)•`(xi(ξ) − ei(ξ)) ≤ q(ξ)•j(ai(ξ−) − ai(ξ))
+p(ξ)•`(ai(ξ−)•j y(ξ)),∀ξ ∈ D
)
As already noticed, Condition (7) holds true due to Assumption C. To ﬁnd the other necessary
conditions, we apply the following result of Cornet–Rockafellar (see the proof in Aliprantis et al.
(2002)).12
Proposition 4 Let (Cκ)κ=1,...,k, k closed subsets of a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space. Let (cκ) ∈
Qk
κ=1 Cκ such that
Pk






From Assumption C, there exists ε > 0 such that for all t ∈]0,ε[, for all xi ∈ B(xi,ε)∩adhPi(xi),
xi + t1ξ0 ∈ Pi(xi). Let C1 = Bi(p,q,y), C2 = (B(xi,ε) ∩ adhPi(xi)) × (RD
−
)J and c1 = c2 = (xi,ai).
We now show that c1−c2 = 0 belongs to the boundary of C1−C2. Let v = (1ξ0,0) ∈ (RL)D×(RD
−
)J.
It suﬃces to show that, for all t ∈]0,ε[, tv / ∈ C1 − C2. If it is not true, there exist t ∈]0,ε[, (˜ xi,˜ ai) ∈
(B(xi,ε) ∩ adhPi(xi)) × (RD
−
)J and (xi,ai) ∈ Bi(p,q,y) such that xi = ˜ xi + t1ξ0 and ai = ˜ ai. From
Assumption C, xi = ˜ xi+t1ξ0 ∈ Pi(xi). Thus (xi,ai) ∈ ˜ Pi(xi). Since, one also has (xi,ai) ∈ Bi(p,q,y),
this contradicts ˜ Pi(xi) ∩ Bi(p,q,y) = ∅.









































Since Bi(p,q,y) is a closed convex subset, Clarke’s normal cone is the standard cone of the convex








+ )J and ςi ∈ RD
+
such that
1. αi(ξ) = ςi(ξ)p(ξ) − ϑi(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ D;
2. $i
j(ξ) = −τi
j(ξ) + ςi(ξ)qj(ξ) −
P
ξ0∈ξ+ ςi(ξ0)(qj(ξ0) + yj(ξ0)),∀ξ ∈ D−;
3. ϑi(ξ)•` xi(ξ) = 0,∀ξ ∈ D.
4. τi
j(ξ)ai
j(ξ) = 0,∀j ∈ J,∀ξ ∈ D−.







and $i = 0
and
for every j ∈ J,τi








Equation (9) of Lemma 1 is deduced from the above equations and relations 2 and 4 with πi = ςi.
We now show that −(πi(ξ)p(ξ)) belongs to N
 
adhPi(xi),xi




is a convex cone and −αi belongs to it, it suﬃces to show that −ϑi belongs to it.
Note that ϑi ∈ (RL
+)D and ϑi(ξ)•` xi(ξ) = 0. Consequently, the projection of xi − ϑi on (RL
+)D is
xi. Hence, since adhPi(xi) ⊂ RD
+, the projection of xi − ϑi on adhPi(xi) is xi. This means that13




We now prove that πi 6= 0. If it is not true, then the relation 1 implies that αi ≤ 0. Furthermore,
αi 6= 0 since (αi,$i) 6= 0 and $i = 0. From Assumption C, for all ξ ∈ D, 1ξ belongs to the polar of
the normal cone N(adhPi(xi),xi) that is T(adhPi(xi),xi). Then, since αi ∈ −N(adhPi(xi),xi), one
deduces that αi · 1ξ = αi(ξ)•` 1 ≥ 0, which together with αi ≤ 0 implies αi = 0. Hence, one gets a
contradiction.
Second step: suﬃcient conditions. Let (xi,ai) ∈ (RL
+)D × (RD
−
+ )J, which satisﬁes Conditions (7),




j∈J Y j. Then, (xi,ai) belongs
to the budget set Bi(p,q,y). We ﬁrst remark that for all xi ∈ Pi(xi), Condition (8), Pi(xi) open and








ξ · xi > 0. (12)
From Assumption C, for all ξ ∈ D, xi + t1ξ ∈ Pi(xi) for some t > 0. One then deduces from
the previous inequality that πi(ξ)(p(ξ)•` 1) > 0, which implies πi(ξ) > 0. Now, we prove that it is
optimal by contradiction. If (xi,ai) is not a maximal element of Pi(xi) in the budget set Bi(p,q,y),
there exists (xi,ai) ∈

˜ Pi(xi) ∩ Bi(p,q,y)

with ˜ Pi(xi) = Pi(xi) × (RD
−
+ )J. Since (xi,ai) belongs to













≤ 0,∀ξ ∈ D. (13)




















































































































































Thus, one gets a contradiction with Inequality (12).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We end this section with the proof of Theorem 3.1. We recall the result of Jofr´ e–Rivera-Cayupi
(1998), which is an extension of the result of Cornet–Rockafellar. In the following result, ∂g denotes
the generalized gradient of a locally Lipschitz function g (see, Clarke (1983)) and dZ denotes the
distance function to Z.
Theorem 4.1 Let f :
Qn
k=1 R`k −→ R`0 be a locally Lipschitz mapping, {Zk}
n
k=1 be a ﬁnite family
of nonempty closed subsets such that Zk is a subset of R`k for all k = 1,...,n. Let z := (z1,...,zn) ∈
Z1×...×Zn such that f(z) ∈ Fr[f(Z1,...,Zn)]. Then, there exists π ∈ R`0,π 6= 0 such that,




There is a slight diﬀerence with the original result since we allow the sets Zk to be subsets of
diﬀerent Euclidean spaces. The proof is the same with only some changes in the notations. We will
actually use in the application of this result the inclusion ∂dZk(zk) ⊂ N(Zk,zk). We now come to
the proof of Theorem 3.1, which is organized as follows: we take as ﬁxed a constrained Pareto optimal
allocation (x,a,y); in the ﬁrst step, we deﬁne the function f, the ﬁnite family of nonempty closed sets
{Zk}
5
k=1 and z, and, we prove that f(z) belongs to Fr(f(z)) using Assumption C; in the second step,
we apply Theorem 4.1, and, we compute ∂(πtf)(z); in the third step, we conclude by showing that we
recover the conditions (i) to (v) of Theorem 3.1.






















































































































From Assumption C, for each i ∈ I, there exists εi > 0 such that for all t ∈]0,εi[, for all xi ∈
B(xi,ε) ∩ adhPi(xi), xi + t1ξ0 belongs to the interior of Pi(xi). Let ε = min{εi | i ∈ I}. Let
Z1 = HD
+
, Z2 = (RD
−
0 )J, Z3 =
Q
i∈I adhPi(xi) ∩ B(xi,ε), Z4 =
Q
j∈J Y j and Z5 = (RD
−
+ )IJ. Note



























Let (x,a,y) be the constrained Pareto optimum that we consider and let p and q be the spot prices
and the stock prices, which ﬁnance it. One easily checks that z = (p,q,x,y,a) satisﬁes w = f(z) and
z ∈
Q5




. For all i ∈ I, let
vi = (0JD−,1,(0)ξ∈D+,0RID+) ∈ (RJ)D
−














for all t ∈]0,[. Let us assume









. Then it exists
z = (p,q,x,y,a) ∈
Q5














































































For all i ∈ I, let xi0 = xi + t1ξ0. Then, Assumption C and the choice of  imply that xi0 ∈ Pi(xi),
for all i ∈ I. Furthermore, the above conditions implies that (x0,a,y) is constrained feasible. Indeed, it




j∈J yj(ξ) for all ξ ∈ D+. From the above equalities,
we know that the projection on1⊥ is equal to 0. Then, the vector is proportional to 1. From the
last equalities, summing over i ∈ I and recalling that
P
i∈I ai










Finally, one gets a contradiction with the fact that (x,a,y) is a constrained Pareto optimum.




,p(ξ0),(σ(ξ))ξ∈D+,(πi(ξ))i∈I,ξ∈D+), π 6= 0, such that















































































+ )I  νi
j(ξ)ai
j(ξ) = 0,∀ξ ∈ D−
)
. (17)
To compute tDf (z)(π), we use the following property: for all γ ∈
Q5
k=1 R`k, for all π ∈ R`0,
π · Df (z)(γ) = γ · tDf (z)(π). (18)
Let us compute DF(z)(γ) for γ = (β,κ,α,ζ,θ) ∈ HD × (RD
−


















































and for all i ∈ I, Df
3,i
ξ (z)(γ) is equal to

   
   




j(ξ−)yj(ξ) + p(ξ)•` ai




β(ξ)•`(xi(ξ) − ei(ξ)) + p(ξ)•` αi(ξ) −
P
j∈J[β(ξ)•` ai




Then, π · Df (z)(γ) is equal to
P
ξ∈D− v(ξ)•j Df1












From this formula, one deduces that
tDf (z)(π) =






















































































Combining Equations (16) and (19), one gets Conditions (i) to (v) of Theorem 3.1. For Equation














































The second equality comes from the condition B = 0. Hence p(ξ)•`(λ(ξ)1) = λ(ξ) = 0, which leads
to Equation (3).We end the proof by showing that there exists i ∈ I such that pi 6= 0. If p(ξ0), πi(ξ)
and σ(ξ) are all equal to 0 for all i and ξ, then, using Equations (6), one gets v = 0 since for all j and
for all ξ, there exists at least a consumer i such that ai
j(ξ) > 0. This contradicts π 6= 0. Hence p(ξ0),
πi(ξ) and σ(ξ) are not all equal to 0 for all i and ξ. Consequently, pi is not equal to 0 for at least one
consumer. From Assumption C, 1ξ belongs to T(adhPi(xi),xi). Since pi ∈ −N(adhPi(xi),xi), one
gets pi · 1ξ ≥ 0. Since σ(ξ) ∈ 1⊥, one gets p(ξ0)•` 1 ≥ 0 and πi(ξ) ≥ 0 for all i and ξ.18
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